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PUNISHING PUNDITS: PEOPLE V. DYLESKI
AND THE GAG ORDER AS PRIOR RESTRAINT
IN HIGH-PROFILE CASES
Michael D. Seplow & Paul L. Hoffman*
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Constitutionality of Gag Orders
This Article considers the constitutionality of gag orders that
restrain all people who are associated, even peripherally, with a high-
profile criminal trial from engaging in the public debate surrounding
the case. In an effort to suppress the general level of media
coverage, such orders may function as a type of prior restraint to
those who may be seen as participants in the trial, and yet are not
parties to it. This issue is considered in the context of People v.
Dyleski, a high-profile murder case pending in Northern California.I
In Dyleski, a superior court judge issued a gag order against
Gloria Allred, a nationally known legal commentator, because she
represents a potential witness in the proceedings. Ostensibly to
ensure the fairness of the legal process, the order prevents Ms. Allred
from discussing a variety of subjects concerning the case, many that
* Michael D. Seplow and Paul L. Hoffman are partners in Schonbrun,
DeSimone, Seplow, Harris & Hoffman, LLP, in Venice, California. They are
counsel of record for Gloria Allred in People v Dyleski. Michael D. Seplow
has litigated numerous cases at the trial and appellate levels in the Federal and
California courts on a variety of issues, including civil rights, employment law
and the First Amendment. Paul L. Hoffman is the former Legal Director of the
ACLU Foundation of Southern California. He has litigated numerous cases
involving gag orders.
1. People v. Dyleski is pending in the Superior Court of Contra Costa
County. Felony Complaint, People v. Dyleski, No. 03-219113-8 (Cal. Super.
Ct. filed Oct. 21, 2005; renumbered No. 05-060254-0, Feb. 24, 2006).
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have already been well-exposed in the media.2
This Article argues that courts cannot prevent commentators like
Ms. Allred from expressing their views about pending cases,
especially matters already in the public domain, that are unrelated to
the protection of criminal defendants from the disclosure of prej-
udicial information. 3 Such broad gag orders go beyond protecting a
defendant's right to a fair trial. And although many lament the
intensity of media coverage in certain high-profile criminal cases, in
our open society with its open courts, the First Amendment must be
able to prevent the government from unduly restricting media
coverage. In the authors' view, First Amendment protection should
bar courts from issuing gag orders that act as blanket restraints
intended to reduce the overall media coverage given to a particular
case.
For better or worse, the amount of attention the media pays to
any particular case will be regulated by the marketplace of ideas and
not by judicial fiat. Gag orders directed at those associated with a
trial must therefore be narrowly tailored and specifically limited to
prevent only the disclosure of particularly prejudicial evidence.4
Persons associated with a proceeding, especially those that are
2. The authors represent Ms. Allred in proceedings challenging the gag
order. A petition for review was filed before the California Supreme Court.
Petition for Review, Allred v. Superior Court, No. S140816 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Jan.
23, 2006). The petition was denied. Order Denying Petition for Review,
Allred v. Superior Court, No. S140816 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Mar. 15, 2006). The
United States Supreme Court denied Ms. Allred's Petition for Certiorari on
October 2, 2006. Allred v. Superior Court, 127 S. Ct. 80 (2006).
3. By "prejudicial" we mean information that would likely cause jurors to
pre-judge the case instead of making their decision based solely on evidence
introduced at trial. This would include the release of inadmissible evidence-
for example, the defendant's refusal to take a lie detector test, or the premature
release of information adverse to the defense or the prosecution prior to its
presentation at trial. However, the Sixth Amendment guarantees that criminal
trials be open to the public. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The courts, therefore,
may not restrict the disclosure of evidence-even if it is harmful to a particular
party-when it is presented as part of a criminal proceeding. Cf Richmond
Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 573-74 & n.9 (1980) (noting a
"presumption of openness" and the importance of keeping the public informed
in criminal trials). Consequently, gag orders usually affect only the timing of
the public disclosure of admissible, prejudicial information.
4. See Levine v. U.S. Dist. Court, 764 F.2d 590, 595 (9th Cir. 1985).
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peripherally associated, ought not to lose their right to participate in
free discussion simply because of their connection to the case.
B. Competing Interests
Granted, the balance between freedom of speech and the right to
a fair trial can be difficult to achieve. Ever since the United States
Supreme Court reversed the murder conviction of Dr. Sam Sheppard
in Sheppard v. Maxwell,5 courts have struggled to find appropriate
means to protect criminal defendants from the prejudicial effects of
pre-trial publicity while preserving the First Amendment's guarantee
of freedom of speech.
In Sheppard, the Supreme Court recognized the authority of trial
courts to proscribe:
extrajudicial statements by any lawyer, party, witness, or
court official which divulge[s] prejudicial matters, such as
the refusal of [the defendant] to submit to interrogation or
take any lie detector tests; any statement made by [the
defendant] to officials; the identity of prospective witnesses
or their probable testimony; any belief in guilt or
innocence; or like statements concerning the merits of the
case.
6
Thus, Sheppard established that, under appropriate circumstances,
courts have the constitutional authority to impose gag orders on the
parties, their counsel and witnesses (including police investigators)in
order to protect the fairness of the proceedings. 7 But it is equally
settled that courts have only limited authority, constrained by the
First Amendment, to proscribe public statements by the press or
other persons not directly involved in the proceedings. 8 Any court
order that forbids reporting by the press about a pending legal
proceeding constitutes a prior restraint. 9 And prior restraints on
5. 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
6. Id. at 361.
7. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 218 F.3d 415 (5th Cir. 2000), cert
denied, 531 U.S. 1111 (2001); see also Dow Jones & Co. v. Simon, 842 F.2d
603 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 946 (1988); United States v. Ford,
830 F.2d 596 (6th Cir. 1987); Levine v. Dist. Court, 764 F.2d 590 (9th Cir.
19 85), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1158 (1986).
8. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 570 (1976).
9. Id. at 556.
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speech and publication are considered "the most serious and the least
tolerable infringement on First Amendment rights."' 0
What is most notable, then, about Ms. Allred's relation to the
Dyleski case is that she occupies the no-man's land somewhere
between the role of journalist on one hand, and the role of advocate
for one of the parties on the other. As she has done in numerous
other cases, Ms. Allred represents a potential witness in the
underlying criminal case and has acted on behalf of her client. But
she also has regularly participated in the national media coverage of
several high-profile criminal trials. Thus, the question posed by
Dyleski is whether Sheppard and its progeny authorize trial judges to
issue gag orders broad enough to prevent all those associated with a
trial from taking part in the public debate about a pending case. This
Article contends that the Dyleski court improperly issued a gag order
to unconstitutionally restrain the general public debate and media
coverage surrounding the case. Instead of functioning as a blanket
reduction, gag orders should only protect a defendant from the
prejudicial, premature disclosure of admissible evidence, or any
disclosure of inadmissible evidence.
C. Roadmap
This Article first recounts the events leading up to the Dyleski
gag order. It then discusses leading cases that lay out how far a court
can go when it regulates speech in the interest of promoting fair
criminal trials.
Next, the authors argue that gag orders aimed at curbing pre-trail
publicity do little to promote the fairness of criminal trials, and yet
place unwarranted restrictions on trial participants' freedom of
expression. Often, gag orders stifle legitimate criticisms of
government actions, expression considered core political speech at
the heart of the First Amendment. Moreover, gag orders fail to
recognize that even parties' attorneys may often have a duty to make
extra-judicial statements to protect their clients' best interests.
Finally, the authors conclude that gag orders in criminal cases
10. Id. at 559. In Nebraska Press Ass 'n, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a
gag order restricting public statements by the press about a pending case may
only be entered where: (1) there is a clear or serious threat to the fairness of the
trial; (2) less restrictive alternatives are not adequate to mitigate the harm; and
(3) the order would effectively prevent the threatened danger. See id. at 562.
1200
December 2006] GAG ORDER AS PRIOR RESTRAINT
are often overly broad, vague, ineffective and unnecessary. In most
instances, the integrity of criminal proceedings can be protected by
alternative means, such as the court's use of probing voir dire,
detailed jury instructions, and changes in venue. The integrity of the
proceedings may be further safeguarded by adopting rules of
professional conduct that bar attorneys from making statements
prejudicial to the fairness of the proceedings.
II. THE GENESIS OF THE GAG ORDER 1N PEOPLE V. DYLESKI
On October 15, 2005, Pamela Vitale, the wife of Daniel
Horowitz, a prominent criminal defense attorney, was killed in her
family home near the small town of Lafayette, California." On
October 21, 2005, the District Attorney for Contra Costa County
(D.A.) filed a criminal complaint in superior court against 16 year
old Scott Edward Dyleski for the murder.' 2 Although he was only
sixteen at the time of the alleged crime, Dyleski was charged as an
adult. '
The criminal complaint did not allege a motive, but the media
reported the murder occurred when Dyleski went to Ms. Vitale's
home to retrieve marijuana growing equipment that he had ordered
using a stolen credit card. 14 According to the pleading, Dyleski used
a bludgeon to kill the victim. 15
The victim's husband, Daniel Horowitz, had himself frequently
appeared as a television commentator on criminal matters. 16 His
prominence coupled with the circumstances of his wife's death
ensured that the proceedings would be the subject of intense local
and national media interest. The media, most notably cable
television, widely reported the murder. 17 The fact that Mr. Horowitz
11. Police: Lawyer's Wife Beaten to Death, CNN.COM, (Oct. 18, 2005),
http://www.cnn.com/2005/US/10/17/attorney.wifeslain/index.html.
12. Felony Complaint, supra note 1, at 1.
13. Bruce Gerstman, Mother of Murder Suspect Assisted After Fact, Police
Say, CONTRA COSTA TIMES, Oct. 28, 2005, at Al.
14. Dyleski Mother Arrested As Accessory, CONTRA COSTA TIMES, Oct. 27,
2005 at Al.
15. Felony Complaint, supra note 1, at 1.
16. See Police: Lawyer's Wife Beaten to Death, supra note 11.
17. See People's Exhibit A, submitted at Hearing, People v. Dyleski, No.
03-219113-8 (Cal. Super. Ct. Nov. 16, 2005; renumbered No. 05-060254-0,
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was himself participating in another high-profile murder case at the
time of his wife's death only increased the visibility of the Dyleski
case.
18
In late October 2005, Gloria Allred and her firm were retained
by an unidentified potential witness in the Dyleski case' 9-- the
girlfriend of the defendant. 20  On October 24, 2005, Ms. Allred
contacted the D.A.'s office on behalf of her client, a minor at the
time, to alert the prosecution that her client was a potential witness in
the case.21 Neither the police nor the D.A.'s office had previously
contacted Ms. Allred's client.22  Ms. Allred and the prosecutor
agreed to meet several days later, on October 27th, to discuss her
client's potential testimony.
23
The next morning, however, on October 25, 2005, Ms. Allred
was informed that her client's residence was being searched by the
police, and that the D.A. had subpoenaed the young woman to appear
before a grand jury later that day.24 Ms. Allred contacted the D.A.'s
office and requested that her client's grand jury testimony be
postponed to the following day, October 26, 2005, to give Ms. Allred
the opportunity to consult with her client and to be present outside
the grand jury room.25 The D.A. refused the request.26
On October 26, 2005, defendant's counsel moved for a gag
order to restrict public statements about actions taken by police and
Feb. 24, 2006).
18. See Police: Lawyer's Wife Beaten to Death, supra note 11.
19. On numerous occasions, Ms. Allred and her law firm have represented
potential witnesses in criminal actions, including several high-profile homicide
cases. See Opposition to Proposed Imposition of a Gag Order Upon Gloria
Allred and Allred, Maroko & Goldberg, Memorandum of Points and
Authorities, Declaration of Gloria Allred at 10:26-27, People v. Dyleski, No.
03-219113-8 (Cal. Super. Ct. Oct. 27, 2005; renumbered No. 05-060254-0,
Feb. 24, 2006) [hereinafter Declaration of Gloria Allred]. For example, Ms.
Allred represented Amber Frey, a witness in the Scott Peterson murder trial.
See id. at 11:1, 8:13-14.
20. Id. at 8:14-16.
21. Id. at 8:7-10.
22. Id. at 10:4-6.
23. See id. at 8:22-23.
24. Id. at 8:24-27.
25. Id. at 8:27 to 9:1-2.
26. Id. at 9:2-4.
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27prosecution on October 25, 2005. The D.A. promptly joined the
defendant's motion and also specifically requested that the protective
order apply not only to defense counsel, but to Ms. Allred and her
law firm as well.28 In papers filed in support of his request for a gag
order, the D.A. expressed concern that Ms. Allred's presence in the
case could "act as a lightning rod for the national broadcast media."
29 He noted that Ms. Allred was already scheduled to appear on a
cable television program concerning the Dyleski case.
30
On October 27, 2005, the following day, the court issued a broad
interim Protective Order. 3' When it failed to specifically mention
Ms. Allred, the D.A. sought to have it amended so that the gag order
applied expressly to Ms. Allred and her firm. 32 The D.A. objected to
Ms. Allred's appearance on a cable television show in which Ms.
Allred purportedly stated that her client was "doing the right thing,"
27. Notice of Motion for Protective Order, People v. Dyleski, No. 03-
219113-8 (Cal. Super. Ct. Oct. 26, 2005; renumbered No. 05-060254-0, Feb.
24, 2006).
28. People's Request for a Protective Order, People v. Dyleski, No. 03-
219113-8, (Cal. Super. Ct. Oct. 26, 2005; renumbered No. 05-060254-0, Feb.
24, 2006).
Prior to the Dyleski case, Ms. Allred has never been subjected to a gag order,
despite the fact that she has represented prominent witnesses in many criminal
proceedings. Declaration of Gloria Allred, supra note 19, at 11:4-7.
Moreover, she has no record of any disciplinary action before the California
State Bar. Id. at 11: 18-21.
29. People's Request for a Protective Order, Declaration of Harold W.
Jewett in Support of People's Request for a Protective Order at 1:27-28,
People v. Dyleski, No. 03-219113-8 (Cal. Super. Ct. Oct. 26, 2005;
renumbered No. 05-060254-0, Feb. 24, 2006) [hereinafter Declaration of
Harold W. Jewett]. The Prosecution in the Dyleski case also expressed disdain
for the widespread media coverage of criminal cases. "Media intentions,
particularly national broadcast media, have transcended the public's right to
know, and entered the sordid realm of morbid curiosity seekers." People's
Supplemental Request for a Protective Order at 2:15-16, People v. Dyleski,
No. 03-219113-8 (Cal. Super. Ct. Nov. 14, 2005; renumbered No. 05-060254-
0, Feb. 24, 2006).
30. Declaration of Harold W. Jewett, supra note 29, at 2:5-7.
31. See Protective Order, People v. Dyleski, No. 03-219113-8 (Cal. Super.
Ct. Oct. 27, 2005; renumbered No. 05-060254-0, Feb. 24, 2006).
32. People's Supplemental Request for a Protective Order, supra note 29, at
2:19-3:22.
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and "telling the truth.
33
On October 28, 2005, the court issued an Amended Protective
Order that specifically included Ms. Allred and her firm as counsel
for a potential witness.34 Extremely broad in scope, the trial court's
Amended Protective Order prohibited Ms. Allred from making any
statements whatsoever about the case.
35
The court subsequently invited all interested parties to submit
briefs regarding whether the broad protective order should be
modified or rescinded. In supplemental papers filed with the court,
the D.A. argued that "the media has, and most certainly will, seek out
Gloria Allred so long as she represents Defendant's girlfriend.
3 6
The D.A. rejected the notion that Ms. Allred had the right to
participate in the general public debate surrounding the case.
37
Moreover, the D.A. argued that the court should prohibit general
statements by Ms. Allred that attested to her client's character and
credibility.
38
On November 16, 2005, the trial court heard arguments
regarding issuance of the Protective Order39 from counsel for the
33. Declaration of Harold Jewett in Support of Application for
Modification of a Protective Order at 2:18-28, People v. Dyleski, No. 03-
219113-8 (Cal. Super. Ct. Oct. 28, 2005; renumbered No. 05-060254-0, Feb.
24, 2006).
34. Amended Protective Order at 2:2-10, People v. Dyleski, No. 03-
219113-8 (Cal. Super. Ct. Oct. 28, 2005; renumbered No. 05-060254-0, Feb.
24, 2006). The Amended Protective Order provided that:
[U]ntil further order of this Court... attorneys of persons that might be
potential witnesses, or other representatives of such witnesses, shall refrain
from discussing this case, the evidence expected to be used in the case, or the
issues in the case, the merits of the case, or trial tactics or strategy, with the
media or in an otherwise public fashion.
Id.
35. Id. Since the initial gag order was put in place, Ms. Allred has not
issued any public statements regarding her client or the Dyleski case.
36. People's Supplemental Request for a Protective Order, supra note 29, at
2:24-25.
37. See id. at 3:14-16.
38. Id. at 3:7-11.
39. At the time of the hearing, the D.A. filed numerous Internet news
reports about the Dyleski case. Although some reports mentioned that Ms.
Allred had been retained as counsel of a potential witness, none of the articles
contained any quotations from Ms. Allred regarding the facts of the case. See
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prosecution, the defense, the San Francisco Chronicle, and Ms.
Allred.40  Noting that Ms. Allred's counsel was "representing an
attorney who represents a purported unidentified witness," the judge
stated, "[I am] probably making judicial history here because I don't
think anybody's had such an appearance in their court before.'
At the hearing, the D.A. argued for a broad protective order that
specifically applied to Ms. Allred and her firm, to prohibit them from
publicly discussing how their client had been treated by the police
and the D.A. The prosecution stated: "[I]f Miss Allred wants to get
on national television and talk about inflammatory things... about
police officers putting guns to the head of people, that is, in fact, a
comment on the evidence, and it's inflammatory.,
42
On November 21, 2005, the trial court issued a revised
Protective Order that expressly prohibited various persons, including
Ms. Allred and members of her law firm, from making out of court
statements on various topics. 43 The topics included "any opinion or
public comments as to the weight, value or effect of any evidence as
tending to establish either guilt or innocence. 44
The court also issued a Decision Granting In Part and Denying
In Part Motions for Protective Order,45 indicating that it did not want
to give "an advisory opinion regarding ... future communications. 46
Nonetheless, the trial court made it clear that Ms. Allred, as counsel
for a potential witness, could not "preview evidence that might be
provided by, or known to, the witness. 4 7
On November 29, 2005, Ms. Allred filed a Request for
People's Exhibit A, supra note 17.
40. Reporter's Transcript of Proceedings at 3:8-17, People v. Dyleski, No.
03-219113-8 (Cal. Super. Ct. Nov. 16, 2005; renumbered No. 05-060254-0,
Feb. 24, 2006).
41. Id. at 25:23-26.
42. Id. at 33:27-34:2.
43. See Protective Order, supra note 31 at 1:21-2:7.
44. Id. at 2:6-7.
45. Decision Granting In Part and Denying In Part Motions for Protective
Order, People v. Dyleski, No. 03-219113-8 (Cal. Super. Ct. Nov. 21, 2005;
renumbered No. 05-060254-0, Feb. 24, 2006) [hereinafter Decision]. The text
of the November 21, 2005 Protective Order and the accompanying Decision
are set forth in the Appendix to this Article.
46. Id. at 7:6.
47. Id. at 7:14-15.
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Clarification of the Protective Order, in which she contended that the
Protective Order and the Decision were ambiguous as to whether she
was allowed to make certain public statements, including statements
critical of government officials involved in the case.
48
The D.A. filed a response to Ms. Allred's request for
clarification, stating that the gag order was not ambiguous. 49  In
court, he argued that the terms of the Protective Order restrict
members of Ms. Allred's firm from making out of court statements
critical of the actions of the prosecution or the police, including
assertions that actions of the police were harmful to their client and
her family. 50 The trial court denied Ms. Allred's Request for
Clarification on December 5, 2005.51
At first blush, the court's gag order imposed on Ms. Allred
appears reasonable. It prevents her from publicly discussing her
client's potential testimony, a restriction consistent with the First
Amendment in these circumstances and reasonably necessary to
protect the parties' right to a fair trial. In a criminal trial, a court
should clearly be allowed to restrict the disclosure of prejudicial
evidence before it becomes public. 52 Indeed, certain evidence may
be completely excluded as prejudicial.53 Such orders will prevent
48. See Request for Clarification of Nov. 21, 2005 Protective Order by
Attorney Gloria Allred at 3:18-22, People v. Dyleski, No. 03-219113-8 (Cal.
Super. Ct. Nov. 29, 2005; renumbered No. 05-060254-0, Feb. 24, 2006).
49. People's Response to Request for Clarification at 2:7-11, People v.
Dyleski, No. 03-219113-8, (Cal. Super. Ct. Dec. 7, 2005; renumbered No. 05-
060254-0, Feb. 24, 2006).
50. Reporter's Transcript of Proceedings, supra note 40, at 33:27-34:2.
51. Unreported Minute Order, People v. Dyleski, No. 03-219113-8 (Cal.
Super. Ct. Dec. 5, 2005; renumbered No. 05-060254-0, Feb. 24, 2006). On
January 11, 2006, Ms. Allred filed a Petition with the California Court of
Appeal to compel clarification. Petition for Writ of Mandate and/or
Prohibition or Other Appropriate Relief, Allred v. Superior Court, No.
Al 12615 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 11, 2006). On January 12, 2006, the Court of
Appeal summarily denied the petition without explanation. Order Denying
Petition for Writ of Mandate/Prohibition, Allred v. Superior Court, No.
A 112615 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 12, 2006). On January 23, 2006, Ms. Allred and
her firm filed a Petition for Review with the California Supreme Court.
Petition for Review, supra note 2. The Petition was denied. Order Denying
Petition for Review, supra note 2.
52. See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 360 (1966).
53. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 352 (Deering 2006).
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such evidence from ever becoming public and reaching jurors.
However, instead of merely preventing Ms. Allred from
discussing her client's potential testimony (a demand to which she
had already agreed), the gag order effectively prevented her from
engaging in any public debate regarding the Dyleski case. For
example, Ms. Allred was prohibited from offering opinions about the
case that were unrelated to her client's potential testimony,54 even
though no other commentators had been subjected to this restriction.
It is particularly troubling that the order has silenced Ms. Allred
and her firm from making any comments critical of the police or the
D.A. The D.A. has taken the position that the gag order has
expressly prohibited such statements, and the trial court denied Ms.
Allred's request for a clarification on this issue. Therefore, Ms.
Allred could face contempt proceedings if the court accepts the
D.A.'s position, in spite of the compelling argument that the gag
order allows her to criticize the actions of the government with
respect to her client. Thus, the order impedes her ability to make
public statements that she deems necessary to protect her client.
III. GAG ORDERS AND RESTRICTIONS ON SPEECH
BY ATTORNEYS AND TRIAL PARTICIPANTS: AN OVERVIEW
A. Sheppard v. Maxwell
In Sheppard, the Supreme Court reversed the murder conviction
of Dr. Sam Sheppard. The Court held that Sheppard had been denied
the right to a fair trial as a result of extensive prejudicial publicity
and the "carnival" atmosphere in which the trial was conducted.
55
Sheppard is often cited as the leading authority for courts to impose
gag orders restricting trial participants' out of court statements. But
the facts of the case reveal that the Supreme Court based its reversal
on more than excessive pre-trial publicity.
56
True, the media bombarded jurors with prejudicial news reports
about the case, including numerous inflammatory articles attacking
54. Protective Order, supra note 43, at 247.
55. See Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 358.
56. The Court considered the totality of the circumstances surrounding the
trial. Id. at 352. For example, the Court noted that, despite the excessive
publicity, the trial court denied Sheppard's request for a change of venue. Id.
at 352-53.
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Dr. Sheppard's character.57 But the three major local newspapers
also published the names and addresses of the members of the jury
pool.58 "As a consequence, anonymous letters and telephone calls,
as well as calls from friends, regarding the impending prosecution
were received by all of the prospective jurors."5 9 And, unlike most
trials today, the press at the Sheppard trial had the run of the
courtroom.
Approximately 20 representatives of newspapers and wire
services were assigned seats.., by the court. Behind the
bar railing there were four rows of benches. These seats
were likewise assigned by the court for the entire trial. The
first row was occupied by representatives of television and
radio stations, and the second and third rows by reporters
from out-of-town newspapers and magazines....
Representatives of the news media also used all the rooms
on the courtroom floor.... Private telephone lines and
telegraphic equipment were installed in these rooms so that
reports from the trial could be speeded to the papers.
Station WSRS was permitted to set up broadcasting
facilities on the third floor of the courthouse next door to
the jury room, where the jury rested during recesses in the
trial and deliberated. Newscasts were made from this room
throughout the trial, and while the jury reached its verdict.
60
Moreover, the media also dominated the scene outside the
courtroom by photographing and televising trial participants,
including jury members.
6 1
[I]n front of the courthouse, television and newsreel
cameras were occasionally used to take motion pictures of
the participants in the trial, including the jury and the judge.
Indeed, one television broadcast carried a staged interview
of the judge as he entered the courthouse. In the corridors
outside the courtroom there was a host of photographers
and television personnel with flash cameras, portable lights
57. Id. at 342.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 343.
61. See id. at 343-44.
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and motion picture cameras. This group photographed the
prospective jurors during selection of the jury. After the
trial opened, the witnesses, counsel, and jurors were
photographed and televised whenever they entered or left
the courtroom. Sheppard was brought to the courtroom
about 10 minutes before each session began; he was
surrounded by reporters and extensively photographed for
the newspapers and television.
62
The trial participants felt the overwhelming presence of the
media throughout the entire trial, which clearly interfered with the
proceedings.
63
All of these arrangements with the news media and their
massive coverage of the trial continued during the entire
nine weeks of the trial.... Their movement in and out of
the courtroom often caused so much confusion that.., it
was difficult for the witnesses and counsel to be heard...
[and] made confidential talk among Sheppard and his
counsel almost impossible during the proceedings....
[W]hen counsel wished to raise a point with the judge out
of the hearing of the jury it was necessary to move to the
judge's chambers. Even then, news media representatives
so packed the judge's anteroom... [that] often these
matters later appeared in newspapers accessible to the
jury.
64
Moreover, contrary to the orders courts now give to jurors, the
Sheppard trial judge did not instruct jurors to refrain from viewing
press reports about the case or from discussing the case with others.
65
Rather, the judge abdicated his responsibility, merely suggesting that
jurors disregard any newspaper, radio or television reports about the
trial.66
The Supreme Court was highly critical of the trial court's failure
to take steps to ensure the fairness of the proceedings, including its
62. Id.
63. See id. at 344.
64. Id. at 344.
65. Id. at 353.
66. Id. ("I am sure that we shall all feel very much better if we do not
indulge in any newspaper reading or listening to any comments whatever about
the matter while the case is in progress.").
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failure to control the spread of prejudicial publicity. 67 The trial judge
believed that because he could not restrict press reports about the
case, he was also powerless to control the spread of prejudicial
materials outside the courtroom. 68  The Supreme Court noted,
however, that while it may be unconstitutional to place a prior
restraint on press reports about the case, the court did have the power
to control statements by persons directly involved, and thereby
control the type of information that could be reported about the
case.
69
[T]he trial court might well have proscribed extrajudicial
statements by any lawyer, party, witness, or court official
which divulged prejudicial matters, such as the refusal of
Sheppard to submit to interrogation or take any lie detector
tests; any statement made by Sheppard to officials; the
identity of prospective witnesses or their probable
testimony; any belief in guilt or innocence; or like
statements concerning the merits of the case.7 °
At the core of the Sheppard case is the principle "that no one be
punished for a crime without 'a charge fairly made and fairly tried in
a public tribunal free of prejudice, passion, excitement, and
tyrannical power, ' ' 71 and that "the jury's verdict be based on
evidence received in open court, not from outside sources."
72
B. The Expanding Effect of Sheppard
Despite the unique circumstances surrounding the Sheppard
trial, the case is often viewed as granting trial courts broad authority
to control pre-trial publicity. For example, in Nebraska Press Ass'n
v. Stuart,73 the trial court took its concerns about pre-trial publicity
and attempted to expand the scope of Sheppard to another level.
Instead of merely restricting the ability of the parties, witnesses and
67. Id. at 358-59.
68. Id. at 357.
69. See id. at 350, 359.
70. Id. at 361. The Court did not, however, endorse placing any restrictions
on "reporting events that transpire in the courtroom," id. at 362-63, as such
reports enjoy protection under the First Amendment.
71. Id. at 350 (quoting Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 236-37 (1940)).
72. Id. at351.
73. 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
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court personnel from making extra-judicial statements, the trial court
issued an order that prevented the press from reporting any such
statements.74 Although the criminal trial had concluded by the time
the case reached the U.S. Supreme Court,75 the Court recognized that
the issues raised in Nebraska Press Ass 'n would likely be repeated,
76
and established constitutional parameters governing gag orders on
criminal proceedings.77
Using traditional First Amendment analysis, the Supreme Court
determined that the gag order on the press was an unconstitutional
prior restraint. Prior restraint, the Court emphasized, is "the most
serious and the least tolerable infringement on First Amendment
rights,"78 and is presumed unconstitutional.79
As the Supreme Court noted in Nebraska Press Ass'n, the
imposition of a gag order involves the clash of two competing
constitutional principles: the First Amendment's guarantee of
freedom of expression and the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments'
due process guarantee of the right to a fair trial.8 °
In Nebraska Press Ass 'n, the Court determined that courts may
only issue a gag order on the press restricting public statements about
a pending case where: (1) there is a clear or serious threat to the
fairness of the trial; (2) less restrictive alternatives would not
mitigate the harm; and (3) the order would effectively prevent the
81threatened danger. Under this "clear and present danger" analysis,
the court deemed the gag order on the press to be unconstitutional.82
The gag order at issue in Nebraska Press Ass'n specifically
applied to parties that were not participants in the trial.83
Accordingly, the Court applied the constitutional analysis for prior
restraint. But that analysis may not answer the question raised by the
Dyleski case, which is whether a gag order aimed solely at trial
74. Id. at 541,542.
75. Id. at 546.
76. Id. at 546-47.
77. Id. at 570.
78. Id. at 559.
79. Id. at 558.
80. See id. at 556, 561.
81. See id. at 562.
82. See id. at 570.
83. Id. at 541,542.
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participants should be subjected to the same constitutional analysis
applied to prior restraint on the press.
On one hand, such gag orders do not constitute a prior restraint
on members of the press or the public; they do not prohibit
publication of news stories about a pending case. Rather, the gag
order restricts press access to information about the case by barring
trial participants from speaking to the media.
84
On the other hand, a gag order is a prior restraint on the freedom
of expression of those persons who are subject to the order.85 This
raises the question of whether a gag order on trial participants,
including attorneys, should be subject to the same "clear and present
danger" analysis in determining its constitutionality. Or can gag
orders on trial participants be justified under a lesser showing?
C. The "Substantial Likelihood" Standard
The Supreme Court answered this question in Gentile v. State
86Bar of Nevada, when it addressed the constitutionality of speech
restrictions placed on attorneys representing parties in criminal
proceedings. In contrast to Dyleski, Gentile did not deal with a gag
order imposed by a trial court. Instead, the case addressed the
question of whether a criminal defense attorney should be subject to
discipline by the Nevada State Bar for extra-judicial statements he
made about a case he was trying.
87
After his client was indicted, Mr. Gentile, an attorney for a
defendant in a criminal proceeding, gave a press conference in which
he discussed aspects of the case. 88 In particular, Mr. Gentile vouched
84. See Dow Jones & Co. v. Simon, 842 F.2d 603, 608-09 (2d Cir. 1988)
(holding that a gag order on trial participants is not a prior restraint with
respect to the press).
85. See Levine v. U.S. Dist. Court, 764 F.2d 590, 595 (9th Cir. 1985)
(holding that a gag order constitutes a "prior restraint" on the free speech rights
of those subject to the order and is therefore subject to strict scrutiny to ensure
its constitutionality); see also CBS Inc. v. Young, 522 F.2d 234, 239-41 (6th
Cir. 1975) (holding that a broad protective order preventing parties and counsel
from discussing civil litigation regarding the Kent State shooting was an
unconstitutional prior restraint, even though the gag order was directed at the
trial participants and not at the press itself).
86. 501 U.S. 1030 (1991).
87. Id. at 1033.
88. Id.
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for his client's innocence and stated that his client was being made a
scapegoat by the police and the prosecution to cover up their own
misconduct.
89
Several months later, after his client was acquitted, Mr. Gentile
was disciplined by the Nevada Bar Association for violating the
Bar's rules regulating speech by attorneys involved in pending
matters. 90 In his defense, Mr. Gentile claimed that his public
statements were necessary to protect his client against the prejudicial
pre-trial publicity which resulted from leaks to the press by the
police.
9 1
The Supreme Court determined that the Nevada Bar rule, as
applied, was an unconstitutional restriction on Mr. Gentile's free
speech. The Court thus threw out the Nevada Bar's disciplinary
charges against him. 92  Nonetheless, the Court determined that
speech by attorneys in pending cases can be regulated under a lower
standard than the clear and present danger standard of Nebraska
Press Ass'n.9 3 Because lawyers representing clients in pending cases
are key participants in the criminal justice system, the state may
demand some adherence to the precepts of that system by regulating
their speech as well as their conduct.94
The test articulated in Gentile allows a court to curtail attorney
speech that presents "a substantial likelihood of material prejudice"
to the right to a fair trial.95
89. Id. at 1059.
90. See id. at 1033.
91. See id. at 1064.
92. See id. at 1033. Gentile was decided by a divided court. In the part of
the decision written by Justice Kennedy, who was joined by four other justices,
the Court held that the Nevada rule as applied in the case was
unconstitutionally vague in that it did not provide fair notice as to the type of
speech that could be restricted. Id. at 1048, 1051-52. Nonetheless, a different
majority determined that the speech of attorneys representing parties to a
criminal proceeding can be regulated under the "substantial likelihood of
material prejudice" standard, which is a lesser standard than that applied to
restrictions on speech the press. Id. at 1074-75.
93. Id. at 1074.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 1075. "We agree... that the 'substantial likelihood of material
prejudice' standard constitutes a constitutionally permissible balance between
the First Amendment rights of attorneys in pending cases and the State's
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The "substantial likelihood" test ... is constitutional ... for
it is designed to protect the integrity and fairness of a
State's judicial system, and it imposes only narrow and
necessary limitations on lawyers' speech. The limitations
are aimed at two principal evils: (1) comments that are
likely to influence the actual outcome of the trial, and (2)
comments that are likely to prejudice the jury venire, even
if an untainted panel can ultimately be found. Few, if any,
interests under the Constitution are more fundamental than
the right to a fair trial by "impartial" jurors, and an outcome
affected by extrajudicial statements would violate that
fundamental right.
96
Although Gentile did not involve a judicially imposed gag order
on trial participants, subsequent lower court decisions have routinely
applied the "substantial likelihood of material prejudice" standard in
analyzing the constitutionality of gag orders on parties' attorneys.
97
Nonetheless, Gentile dealt with a state bar rule as opposed to a
gag order that constitutes a prior restraint on the speech of trial
participants. Thus, where a state has adopted regulations on attorney
speech that are based on the Gentile standard, it seems unnecessary
for a court to impose a gag order on counsel.
IV. THE OVERUSE OF GAG ORDERS
AIMED AT CURBING PRE-TRIAL PUBLICITY THREATENS
THE FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS OF TRIAL PARTICIPANTS
Dyleski illustrates several dangers that gag orders pose to the
interest in fair trials." Id.
96. Id.
97. See, e.g., United States v. Scarfo, 263 F.3d 80, 93-94 (3d Cir. 2001)
(finding it reasonable to apply the substantial likelihood test to attorney's
speech where attorney was in the same position as the attorney referred to in
Gentile); United States v. Brown, 218 F.3d 415, 428-29 (5th Cir. 2000)
(concluding that the district court identified a substantial likelihood that
extrajudicial comments of trial participants would prejudice its ability to
conduct fair trials). But see Hurvitz v. Hoefflin, 101 Cal. Rptr. 2d 558, 565
(Ct. App. 2000) (requiring "a clear and present danger or serious and imminent
threat" for prior restraint of speech by trial participants). In Hurvitz, the Court
also noted that Article I, Section 2 of the California Constitution provides even
broader protection for freedom of speech than the First Amendment. Id. at
565.
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freedom of expression of those subject to the order.9 8 First, gag
orders are often issued to suppress media coverage in general rather
than focusing on specific threats to the fairness of the proceedings.
As a result, gag orders are not narrowly tailored to address the
specific threats to a fair trial from extra-judicial statements.
Second, courts imposing gag orders often fail to appreciate that
attorneys sometimes have to engage in conduct and speech outside
the realm of formal judicial proceedings in order to protect the
interests of their clients. Certainly, even trial participants have a
right to participate in the public debate surrounding criminal
proceedings, especially where there are allegations of government
misconduct.
Third, the terms of gag orders can be vague, causing those
subjected to the order to refrain from making any statements-even
permissible ones-for fear of being punished for their speech.
In Dyleski, the trial court justified its imposition of a gag order
as necessary to avoid tainting the pool of potential jurors:
The purpose of a protective order in the current
environment is to assure a prospective jury panel, for jury
selection, that has not been bombarded with either facts or
concepts that make it reasonably unlikely that such can be
"put aside" and the case determined solely on the trial
evidence.
99
The trial court's reasoning is consistent with a long line of cases
that hold that the purpose of a gag order is to prevent the tainting of
the jury pool with prejudicial information that could prevent the
selection of an impartial jury. 10 The danger, however, with such a
broadly stated rationale is that it may be applied to a broad range of
comments that will not, in fact, taint the jury pool, but rather, will
98. The gag order imposed on attorney Gloria Allred is unprecedented. The
authors are unaware of any reported cases in California in which a trial court
has imposed a gag order on an attorney for a non-party potential witness.
99. Decision, supra note 45, at 5:12-16.
100. See, e.g., Scarfo, 263 F.3d at 93-94 (noting that gag order on former
trial participant's speech is appropriate when material prejudice could
otherwise result); Brown, 218 F.3d at 428-29 (affirming district court's gag
order on trial participants as appropriate); In re Russell, 726 F.2d 1007, 1010-
11 (4th Cir. 1984) (affirming gag order on witness as necessary to ensure a fair
trial).
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chill public discussions protected under the First Amendment.
Moreover, it appears that the Dyleski court went beyond what is
reasonably necessary to ensure a fair trial for the parties. The court
apparently believed that the best way to protect against prejudicial
pre-trial publicity was to limit media coverage of the case in general.
Such an approach is overbroad and unconstitutional, however, in that
it restricts all types of public statements, regardless of whether they
are likely to prejudice the fairness of the proceedings. As the
Supreme Court noted in Nebraska Press Ass 'n v. Stuart:
[P]re-trial publicity, even if pervasive and concentrated,
cannot be regarded as leading automatically and in every
kind of criminal case to an unfair trial. The decided cases
cannot be made to stand for the proposition that juror
exposure to information about a state defendant's prior
convictions or to news accounts of the crime with which he
is charged alone presumptively deprives the defendant of
due process.
1°1
Indeed, our courts have routinely recognized that high-profile
cases are likely to attract widespread media attention and that there is
little that can be done about this in a free and open society.
Media dissemination of the alleged facts of horrifying and
threatening criminal activity. . unfortunately is a fact of
life in our society. The news reports may, and do, contain
inadmissible hearsay, rank and unfounded opinions,
incriminating statements, inaccurate sketches and more.
But our criminal justice system is deemed to be hearty
enough to withstand prejudicial publicity and still guarantee
a given defendant the most basic right to receive a fair trial.
In this regard, the cost to the criminal justice system to
provide a fair trial is the price we pay for an open society,
and a free press with access to criminal proceedings.'
0 2
Therefore, absent extraordinary circumstances, issuing a broad
101. 427 U.S. 539, 565 (1976) (internal quotation omitted); see also
Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. U.S. Dist. Court., 729 F.2d 1174, 1180 (9th Cir.
1983) ("[I]t is not enough that publicity might prejudice one directly exposed
to it. If it is to be restrained, the publicity must threaten to prejudice the entire
community so that twelve unbiased jurors can not be found.").
102. Tribune Newspapers West, Inc. v. Superior Court, 218 Cal. Rptr. 505,
515 (Ct. App. 1985) (emphasis omitted).
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gag order against an attorney-commentator such as Ms. Allred is
unlikely to have any discernable effect on the press coverage of a
particular case. Given this reality, all that a gag order will do is
suppress some statements about a case, without having any overall
effect on the amount of prejudicial information that could taint the
jury pool.
In Gentile, the Supreme Court noted that the reason for allowing
greater restraints on attorney speech is that attorneys "have special
access to information through discovery and client communications,
[and therefore] their extrajudicial statements pose a threat to the
fairness of a pending proceeding since lawyers' statements are likely
to be received as especially authoritative." 103 The strong counter
argument, however, is that if knowledgeable attorneys, including
prosecutors and defense counsel, are barred from commenting on
pending matters, the vast majority of media coverage will come from
disreputable sources that are only more likely to flood the media with
prejudicial misinformation.
In any event, the aim of any gag order should not be to
indiscriminately curtail pre-trial publicity in general. Rather, the aim
should be to protect the fairness of the trial by taking reasonable
measures to ensure that a fair and impartial jury decides the case
based only upon the evidence admitted at trial. °4
It is well established under the First Amendment that
103. Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1074 (1991) (citing In re
Hinds, 449 A.2d 483, 496 (N.J. 1982)); In re Rachmiel, 449 A.2d 505, 511
(N.J. 1982)).
104. The standard for showing that pre-trial publicity has jeopardized the
right to a fair trial is extremely high. For example, in Mu'Min v. Virginia, 500
U.S. 415, 418 (1991), the community had been subjected to a barrage of
publicity prior to the defendant's capital murder trial. News stories appearing
over a course of several months included details of the crime itself and
numerous items of prejudicial information inadmissible at trial. Id. Eight of
the twelve individuals seated on the jury admitted some exposure to pre-trial
publicity. Id. at 421. Despite this, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the
publicity did not rise even to a level requiring questioning of individual jurors
about the content of publicity. Id. at 431-32.
The authors do not suggest that this standard should govern the issuance
of gag orders. It does, however, suggest a large discrepancy between the
definition of prejudice in terms of appellate review of criminal convictions and
prejudice in terms of the issuance of gag orders.
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governmental restrictions on speech, even when implemented for a
legitimate purpose, "must be narrow and necessary, carefully aimed
at comments likely to influence the trial or judicial determination."]
0 5
Governmental restrictions on speech that are overly broad and stifle
speech beyond the legitimate purpose are unconstitutional.'
10 6
Accordingly, before entering a gag order, the court must make
specific findings to support its issuance.
0 7
Further, before a court imposes an order that unduly restricts the
freedom of expression of those subject to its jurisdiction, it should
consider alternative methods. These could include, for example,
extensive and probing voir dire of jurors, and the "use of emphatic
and clear instructions on the sworn duty of each juror to decide the
issues only on evidence presented in open court.'1 0 8  A court's
implementation of these methods must be genuine, and if a broad gag
order still appears necessary, the court should be required to explain
why such alternative measures are inadequate.
Moreover, when imposing gag orders, courts must also be
cognizant of the rights of all citizens, including trial participants, to
engage in public debate about pending criminal matters. It "would be
difficult to single out any aspect of government of higher concern
and importance to the people than the manner in which criminal
trials are conducted."' 0 9 It is therefore vital that courts allow free
speech to play its part in revealing that process. "The knowledge
that every criminal trial is subject to contemporaneous review in the
105. United States v. Scarfo, 263 F.3d 80, 93 (3d Cir. 2001). The gag order
imposed by the trial court in Scarfo was purportedly aimed at preventing out of
court statements from prejudicing the judge. Id. at 94. The Third Circuit held
that such an order was unconstitutional as it was not narrowly tailored to
address a specific harm:
[T]here was no risk of prejudice to the Judge because judges are experts at
placing aside their personal biases and prejudices, however obtained, before
making reasoned decisions. Judges are experts at closing their eyes and ears to
extraneous or irrelevant matters and focusing only on the relevant in the
proceedings before them. The District Court did not articulate any specific or
general prejudice it would suffer, and we can see none.
Id.
106. Shelton v. Tucker, 346 U.S. 479, 488-90 (1960).
107. See Levine v. U.S. Dist. Court, 764 F.2d 590, 595 (9th Cir. 1985).
108. Neb. Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 564 (1976).
109. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 575 (1980).
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forum of public opinion is an effective restraint on possible abuse of
judicial power .... Without publicity, all other checks are
insufficient: in comparison of publicity, all other checks are of small
account."",10
Also, a gag order that does not provide "fair notice to those to
whom [it] is directed" is unconstitutionally vague."' In Dyleski, the
D.A. contended that the gag order prohibited Ms. Allred from
making public statements critical of the manner in which the
government treated her client. When Ms. Allred disputed this
position and requested a clarification from the trial court, the court
denied her request. 1 2 Given the language of the gag order and the
D.A.'s stated interpretation of it, the court thus placed Ms. Allred in
the untenable position of having to guess whether certain statements
would violate the order's provisions. Ms. Allred was left with no
clear idea as to what she could or could not say in public. If she
guessed incorrectly, she could be subject to punishment by the
court.' 13 This, then, illustrates how a vague gag order chills the
freedom of expression of those under its authority. 114 A proper gag
order should be explicit as to which statements are allowed and
which are proscribed."15
The Dyleski court recognized that it could not prevent other
legal commentators from discussing the case." 16 Instead of treating
Ms. Allred like any other commentator, however, the trial court
110. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 270 (1948).
111. Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1048 (1991) (quoting
Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 112 (1972)).
112. Unreported Minute Order, supra note 51.
113. Cf Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1051 ("The prohibition against vague
regulations of speech is based in part on the need to eliminate the
impermissible risk of discriminatory enforcement.., for history shows that
speech is suppressed when either the speaker or the message is critical of those
who enforce the law").
114. The D.A. has also taken the position that the gag order should prevent
Ms. Allred from making general statements attesting to her client's integrity.
See People's Supplemental Request for a Protective Order, supra note 29, at
3:8-10, 3:19-22. The authors fail to see how such general statements can
present a substantial risk of materially prejudicing the fairness of the
proceedings.
115. See Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1051.
116. See Decision, supra note 45, at 6:23-7:3.
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determined that because of her status as counsel for a potential
witness, she could be subjected to "the same constraints as any
attorney representing a party." 117 But unlike the parties in Dyleski,
Ms. Allred had no formal role in this case, nor did she have access to
any inside information, other than information relating to her client.
Further, the trial court failed to explain why Ms. Allred should be
treated in the same manner as counsel for the parties, especially as
she had already agreed not to comment on her client's potential
testimony. She did not have access to pre-trial discovery and had not
seen the files of either counsel for the prosecution or the defense.' 
18
Moreover, Ms. Allred had no standing to appear in court for her
client, and could not proffer evidence or make arguments in court
regarding the case. Thus, unlike the prosecution and defense
counsel, Ms. Allred is not a participant in this trial.
One must therefore ask whether Ms. Allred should be lumped
together with counsel for the prosecution and defense, or whether she
belongs in a different category. The authors contend that a legal
commentator like Ms. Allred, who also has a peripheral role in a
pending criminal matter, should be subject only to the same
restrictions that apply to the press generally, with one logical
exception-that she be barred from making public statements
concerning her client's potential testimony or other matters that are
not readily known to persons unaffiliated with the pending criminal
matter. Such an approach is narrowly tailored to address the specific
potential danger to a fair trial, while still protecting the rights of
commentators such as Ms. Allred to participate in the public debate.
Dyleski illustrates the dangers of using general gag orders as to
all trial participants. Such unfocused breadth potentially gives party
opponents, especially prosecutors, the power to transform gag orders
into blanket prior restraints. A person in Ms. Allred's position could
hardly risk engaging in public criticism of the D.A.'s conduct when
she has been threatened with contempt proceedings in advance. A
trial court may reasonably refuse to clarify its order, but without
clarification an order may be transformed into a general prohibition
117. Id. at 7:9-10.
118. See Supplemental Declaration of Gloria Allred in Support of Her
Request to Modify or Set Aside Protective Order at 2:10-11, People v.
Dyleski, No. 03-219113-8 (Cal. Super. Ct. Nov. 8, 2005; renumbered No. 05-
060254-0, Feb. 24, 2006).
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on what should be protected speech.
V. GAG ORDERS ON COUNSEL ARE NOT NECESSARY
WHERE A STATE HAS ADOPTED RULES REGULATING
ATTORNEYS THAT ARE CONSISTENT WITH THE CONSTITUTION
Dyleski also raises the question of whether gag orders on
counsel are necessary where a state, consistent with the Constitution,
has promulgated regulations setting forth the obligations of any
attorney with respect to extra-judicial statements. 
19
Rule 5-120 of the California Rules of Professional Conduct,
120
which governs trial publicity, was adopted in 1995 in response to the
Gentile decision. The rule follows the Gentile standard by
proscribing extrajudicial statements by lawyers participating in
litigation which would have "a substantial likelihood of materially
prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding in the matter."'121 Moreover,
the rule specifically allows attorneys to make certain statements
reiterating matters contained in the public record, as well as
statements necessary to protect clients from the prejudicial effects of
pre-trial publicity.122
The threat of state bar disciplinary proceedings for improper
statements is likely enough to police the conduct of attorneys. Such
procedures are based on a full record of past events, a body of
precedents consistently elaborated and enforced, and heard by
decision-makers not involved in the underlying proceedings. Thus,
the risk of idiosyncratic enforcement is minimized. Reliance on state
bar proceedings also minimizes the ability of a party to use gag
orders to achieve broad prior restraints on speech, inconsistent with
the First Amendment.
VI. CONCLUSION
Intense media coverage of high-profile criminal trials is a reality
of twenty-first century America. It is impossible to suppress such
coverage and, for the most part, such coverage is beneficial in a free
119. Clearly, rules regulating attorneys would not apply to non-attorney trial
participants.
120. CAL. R. PROF'L CONDUCT 5-120(A) (2006). The text of Rule 5-120, as
well as the official discussion, is set forth in the appendix.
121. Id.
122. R. 5-120(C).
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society.
The Dyleski gag order exemplifies the danger to First
Amendment values posed by judicial actions to control the media.
Media coverage of high-profile criminal cases is a reality and cannot
be suppressed by judicial action consistent with the First Amendment
and our societal commitment to open trial proceedings.
Trial judges are no doubt confronted with extraordinarily
difficult choices in such circumstances. It is essential, however, that
restrictions on the use of gag orders remain in place so that they do
not become an automatic response to the careful balancing that must
be undertaken to ensure that both First Amendment and Sixth
Amendment rights are protected.
